IV.—THE FIELD OF ÆSTHETICS PSYCHOLOGICALLY CONSIDERED. I.

By H. R. Marshall.

§ 1. Æsthetics may be looked upon as a special branch of the broader Science of Hedonics, and must be so viewed, it appears to me, if we are to make satisfactory progress in the psychological treatment of its problems.

If this be true, the Pleasure-Pain theory which I have advanced (see Mind, 56, 63, and 64) should find corroboration in the phenomena which we call Æsthetic, and the theory in its turn should aid us in grasping Æsthetic principles.

It is probable that some of my readers will be unable to accept as self-evident my position that the essential characteristic in Æsthetics is to be found in the hedonic effect produced by the work of Art,[1] and therefore before I can make use of the corroborative evidence or attempt to indicate the Æsthetic principles to which the theory seems to lead it is necessary to ask these readers to review the steps which lead me to take this view.

It must be stated here that I shall, in what follows, use the words Art and Æsthetics in a very wide sense.

Any device of man which serves to produce in any one an Æsthetic thrill I shall not hesitate to call a work of Art. When a man is experiencing or has experienced an Æsthetic feeling must be judged by his statement which cannot be questioned or by some less distinct expression. We must allow that that object has wrought an Æsthetic effect which has produced on general lines the same individual or racial expression that we accept as evidence of Æsthetic enjoyment in ourselves and our own friends with whom we sympathise fully. I think this wide use of terms will be justified in what follows.

Comparatively few people in our day, even among those who claim wide cultivation, realise how much of human

[1] This consideration of the effect upon the observer is too often obscured by failure to separate it from the problem concerning the impulse which leads to Art production, which is on its face an entirely different matter.

thought has been given in the past to the philosophic consideration of Æsthetics, although the special student of Art theory soon becomes impressed with this fact; for turn whither he will, he finds his way blocked by the ruins of systems which obstruct and obscure his path. That we have reached very little satisfactory result is indeed true, and this fact, no doubt, explains the existing inappreciation of the importance of Æsthetic Philosophy itself and accounts for the small general interest which is taken in the work of the past in this direction.

However tedious the labour be, the student of to-day who hopes to advance must necessarily endeavour to gain a comprehensive view of what has been done in the past. Our relatively modern methods of written record have given to the thought of the past few centuries a retentiveness which makes it for us a didactic entity, and the historical method therefore has in these days become of primary importance. The student of Æsthetic theory finds his work long and laborious, and after it all, must admit, I think, on the whole, that Æsthetic Psychology has gained little of fundamental importance from the discussions by philosophers in the past. This is by no means because Æsthetic problems have been left unconsidered by the best thinkers; rather because they have looked upon them for the most part as secondary issues; issues of moment, truly, but subordinate to systemisation which from other points of view had become of predominant importance.

It is because of this subordination that we find on every side presentations of eminently partial views. In some cases these are held as valid, and made the basis of unsatisfactory dogmatism. In other cases we find the discussion carried forward on lines so narrow that the student becomes doubtful how far the writer has intended to claim his principles as fundamental. Note, for instance, the Cartesian treatment of beauty which limits its range to elements of sight pleasure; and the notion of Aristotle as to the relation of Imitation to Art, to which we refer below: views of masters these are indeed; but views which we are unable to take seriously, now-a-days.

It happens thus that our study brings the masters of thought before us in most cases as "prophets," in the old Scriptural sense, rather than as scientific teachers. They furnish us with inspiration for our work and with data of value drawn from their own experience; of more value indeed, for the most part, than the theories which they propound. On the other hand, we find in many cases men of less im-

portance in the world of thought touching special problems of psychologic æsthetics in more satisfactory manner than the well-recognised master.[1]

It seems to me clear that Non-hedonistic Æsthetic theories have, from a psychological point of view, resulted in failure.

In the section which follows this I attempt to show the lines on which these non-hedonistic theories have developed and the directions in which they fail.

This section may be passed over without break in the argument by any reader who will allow the points contained in the paragraphs with which the third section opens.

§ 2. The earliest definite thought centres around objects which attract attention: nor is this objective reference exclusively a characteristic of crude thinking; it is natural for any one whose point of view is cosmological rather than psychological. We should expect, therefore, to find early writers, and in later times men for whom the world of objects is specially important, examining the beautiful object itself for some quality or qualities which must be present if it is to appear beautiful; qualities which will account for the effect produced by its contemplation.

Aristotle's Æsthetic theory had evidently a strong objective bent. Although he held that one of the ends for which the artist worked was the giving of pleasure, this pleasure was to be given by the imitation of beautiful objects, and in these he thought he had found certain distinctly objective qualities upon which beauty depended; — such as Order, Symmetry, a certain Magnitude.

Only fragments of his Art theory, however, seem to have come down to us, and what we have is so evidently incomplete that it can only be referred to illustratively.

His principle of Imitation, for instance, casts out of the Æsthetic field most of music and practically all of architecture, and his demand for Symmetry excludes much which all the world now-a-days agrees to call æsthetic.

Tendencies to objectivism appear in the æsthetic work of many later writers of the highest authority, *e.g.*, Herbart and

[1] The Æsthetic hedonist does not need to look far for the psychologic explanation of this fact, for it is well recognised that the psychosis of thought is not strong in pleasure-pain elements; men whose lives are given to thought and who *write* of thought must expect to lose in themselves all predominance of Pleasure and Pain in direct connexion with the subject-matter of their writing; and if pleasure be of the essence of æsthetics it is but natural that æsthetic problems should be given a secondary place by such writers.

his followers, and in that of men of less weight from the psychologists' standpoint. Edmund Burke, who has given us a work on the Sublime which is valuable in many directions, shows this tendency. He gives us a set of objective qualities as necessary to beauty, which are manifestly inadequate to cover the ground.[1] The thought of Hogarth as an active art worker in a certain line is worthy of consideration as expressing a *natural*, although superficial, solution of the Æsthetic problem. His six elements of beauty,[2] very different from Burke's, are equally incomprehensive.

This special method of procedure has not often been seriously carried out, however, and doubtless because the difficulties which appear soon became overwhelming. The indefinite variety of those objects which are looked upon as beautiful makes hopeless the task of enumerating objective qualities which shall cover all the ground.

Plato's ideas were emphatically objective, and, notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, modern Idealism itself has never been able to shake off this objectiveness so far as æsthetics is concerned. In presenting to us Ideals, Universals, Absolutes, as fixed æsthetic standards, it has in this very fact taken an objective attitude.[3] The value of modern Idealism in its bearing upon philosophic questions being granted, we must admit, I think, that psychologic æsthetics gains very little from it. So far as its tenets are not covered in what we shall discuss in what follows it gives us little in this direction which is not psychologic mysticism. It has had much to say concerning æsthetics, but largely to force it into line with some preconceived metaphysical system or to make it fill some gap which otherwise would leave the thought sequence incomplete.[4] The relation of the Universal to the Particular; of the Idea to its objective realisation; of the Absolute to the Finite, have been made to account for æsthetic effects in many different ways, but without leaving us any help in deciding why objects are beautiful or which of divergent standards must be accepted. This last question presents the great stumbling-block to the accept-

[1] Smallness of size — Smoothness — Gradual variation of outline — Delicacy—Brightness—Purity and softness of colour.

[2] Fitness to some design—Variety—Uniformity—Regularity or Symmetry—Simplicity—Intricacy—Quantity.

[3] Even those who turn away from an objective search would be likely to say that the æsthetic psychosis implied an objective content, but not even here are thinkers agreed; Schleiermacher seems to hold the productive faculty alone to be essential in Æsthetics.

[4] Kant's treatment under Quantity, Quality, Relativity, Modality.

ance of *any* form of Universal Idealism or Absolutism, so far as Æsthetic standard is concerned; for if there be an absolute Ideal Beauty, a Universal Beauty, why should any one differ radically from me as to whether an object before us is æsthetic or not? Or again, why should my own change of mental attitude make me think that beautiful now, which some years ago I thought worthless? Perhaps my reader will say, with Lotze, that development of capacity for the apprehension of this Ideal is necessary; that if he thinks the object before us is beautiful and I do not, it shows that my capacity to grasp the Ideal is more limited than his own. But suppose before us an object which you call æsthetic, and which is not merely negatively indifferent to me, but positively ugly—disagreeable to me; although I may perhaps be able to look back to a time when it was æsthetic for me also. It is not that I find it unæsthetic, but utterly the reverse of æsthetic; that is, it is quite *opposed* to my standard, while it is in accord with yours; the standards, therefore, cannot differ by mere limitation, but are radically contradictory. Bergman[1] suggests the ingenious hypothesis that the difference lies in actual difference of object grasped; that you and I *think* we grasp the same thing, but really do not. That the Ideals do not differ, but that we are incorrectly comparing different Ideals. If this position be accepted, we must, so far as I can see, acknowledge all taste as equally authoritative in the positing of a standard, and this takes away the very basis of the Idealistic position here discussed. Perhaps it might be maintained that, notwithstanding this diversity of the appreciation of beauty, the criterion of Universality is valid, by claiming that that is called beautiful which we *think* of as Universal, however far that Universality may be from being a fact. Such argument, however, will not hold, for in most cases we are aware fully of the existence of diverse views as to the object which is beautiful for us, and notwithstanding this, our feeling is distinct and clear and is not in its essence changed by any consideration of the fact that others differ from us in their judgment.

Mr. Begg,[2] who approaches the subject from an intuitionist's standpoint, takes a distinct objective position, and acutely suggests that diversity of standard does not argue against the objectiveness of beauty but in favour of its universal distribution. Different people differ in their capacity

[1] Bergman, *Ueber das Schöne*, pp. 168 ff.

[2] W. Proudfoot Begg, *The Development of Taste and other Studies in Æsthetics*, chap. viii.

to perceive the beauty in some special object, but it is there for all that, if one single person sees it. He who considers the object ugly is so constituted that he is affected by other qualities in the object than its beauty, and these latter draw his thought away to special ugliness.

Such a position, however, if I understand it, can be maintained only by one who has not yet seen the force of the modern criticism of "faculty psychology". The argument in favour of beauty as a manifestation of an objective universality is weakened by the lack of any clear separation of the character of universality from the non-æsthetic. I, for my part, cannot agree that the merely agreeable is not often recognised as non-individual. What others call pleasure, people as a rule are very ready to class as agreeable, while they are not at all ready to allow an objective impression to be beautiful unless they delight in it themselves. On the other hand, I cannot feel that the æsthetic thrill is any less egoistic than the most purely individual sense gratification. Truly the work of art is realised as giving pleasure to others as well as ourselves, and this knowledge of sympathy adds keenly to our enjoyment, but mere universality does not raise a pleasure into the æsthetic field, for were this so, many of those pleasures which we call the very lowest would be of the very highest æsthetic value, and much that we hold to be best would be cut out of the field by the smallness of the number who rejoice with us. It is patent to all that the world of the artist who is in advance is small, and yet we cannot on any acceptation of terms say that his work is on that account unæsthetic. If we gain little else from the study of these systems, one fact is brought to our notice which is of considerable psychologic importance, and to which we shall return, namely, that these thinkers find their æsthetic field not only wide but relatively permanent; were it not so, introspection would so clearly deny the conceptions of Universality and Absolutism that they could not be defended.

Let us now turn to the subjective view of the Æsthetic Field.

Could we go back to the days of the "Faculty Psychologists" our task were simple, for then we, with Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, might satisfy ourselves by the assumption of a special internal sense for the perception of beauty; modern psychology, however, compels us to discard this and all kindred views.

Earlier thought of an introspective character, whatever be its direction, tends to lay especial stress upon (*a*) Sen-

sualism. We see this to-day in the careful work of our painstaking psycho-physicists and in the thought of those whom they influence: in fact, we all find it difficult to avoid over-emphasis of the importance of sense-organ products. The study of the beautiful from its introspective side has not infrequently shown this same over-emphasis.[1] The very term Æsthetics in its derivation has a *sense* connotation: Baumgarten first used it because he looked upon the beautiful as the perfection of Sensuous knowledge, and Kant's "Transcendental *Æsthetic*" treats of the *a priori* principles of *Sense*. Perhaps the most thorough-going statement of the Sensualistic position is given in our own time by Mr. Grant Allen in his *Physiological Æsthetics*, but he himself has apparently lost faith in his own work[2] in this special direction, and it need not therefore be considered at length. Although the sense-impressions give the normal initiative in a vast majority of our æsthetic psychoses, it is impossible in the field of sense to obtain any satisfactory solution of æsthetic problems: and men will not accept a view so narrow; they recognise at once that the effect produced upon them by a beautiful object is wider and fuller than sense-impression.

(*b*) If the use of terms forms a basis for classification, a good deal of the theory of the past may be classed as *Emotional*, and this is true, especially among English thinkers, of whom we may mention Alison and Jas. Mill. But "Emotion" is a word of very indefinite meaning when it is made to describe the æsthetic field. It is either employed with little departure from the usage of the question-waiving "faculty psychologists," or else it represents little more than complexity of Pleasure or Pain. Emotionalism under the first signification merely restates the questions of Æsthetics, and under the second throws us back upon hedonism, which we shall presently consider.

(*c*) The most emphatic drift of thought in the direction of the Content is, and has been, towards *Intellectualism*, and naturally so. When critical examination fails to show any special intellectual product which, in width and in nature, corresponds with Æsthetic effect, there is a natural diversion of attention to the examination of the Intellectual processes

[1] Burke is quoted by Von Hartmann as a representative sensualist, but I think it more proper to class him as an Emotionalist. He defines Beauty as a "quality by which an object causes love or some passion similar to it".

[2] See MIND, No. 45.

themselves, which leads in its extreme development to (*d*) bald Rationalism.

"Harmony" of mental action (and cruder notions as to objective harmony are seldom altogether eliminated) and the process of "Unification of the Manifold" are now and again brought forward as all sufficient to account for Æsthetic result: but it is easy to show that we live in an atmosphere of harmonies and are constantly dealing with unities in manifoldness which not only have no marked æsthetic character, but ordinarily are devoid of all æsthetic character whatever, and the same argument holds against other similar principles.

Rationalism even in its crudest form takes a strong hold upon men's minds, and maintains its ground, especially among German thinkers, although often too covertly held and vaguely stated. It is easy to see, however, that no amount of argument, however conclusive its form may be, can change our notion of what is, or what is not, beautiful unless it induce an actual change in the matter which is presented to thought. No better position is gained by referring the process to sub-consciousness;—by arguing that the effect is due to recognition of relations too delicate to rise above the "threshold," but grasped, for all that, in the Æsthetic state of mind.

This is a cowardly means of covering defeat which one with no little surprise finds willingly accepted by thinkers of the highest rank to this day (*e.g.*, Helmholtz and his school), and with the best of authorities in the past to give weight to such method: for it must be remembered that Kant was only willing to give Music a position among the Arts of Beauty because of the fine mathematical relation between harmonious tones which from other investigations have been found to exist, and which he supposed to be sub-consciously grasped in the Æsthetic effects of Music.

The vaguer statements of simpler Intellectualism, which one finds so frequently, merely go to emphasise the fact that reflective thought is of the greatest importance in the Æsthetic psychosis. The best work of later writers, as we shall see in what follows, tends to give value not only to the Sensual, and the Emotional, but also to the Intellectual, as all involved in the æsthetic state, as we know it, and this is the position to which we would be led by our synthetic line of thought, if no other evidence appeared.

I do not find that the contentions of the Formalist, except so far as they are hedonistic, go far to help us psychologically. Concrete formalism fails to give us any unassail-

able criterion of the æsthetic, and abstract formalism gives us nothing more valuable, from our point of view, than a mere restatement of the fact that we must look elsewhere than to sensualism, or to the matter of the content, for the essence of the æsthetic. But so far as Formalism is hedonistic, it points, it seems to me, in the right direction. This hedonistic view will receive full discussion in what follows.

§ 3. Although the discussions which have been above reviewed are very unsatisfying, they serve to give emphasis to the fact that the field of Æsthetics is always hedonic; and this is a fact of great psychological importance. Whatever else may be said of the æsthetic mental state, its pleasurableness cannot be questioned. It is not necessary therefore to prove the hedonic connexion, and, on the other hand, I do not see how it is possible for any one to pass it over lightly. Thinkers of all grades and of all schools, from Aristotle downwards, acknowledge the necessary connexion with pleasure whatever position they take as to the value or importance of this fact.

It is not difficult indeed to find authorities, from Epicurus down, whose statements may be interpreted as decisive expressions of the view for which I argue: and some few, Fechner, for example, who distinctly base Æsthetics upon Hedonics. The average man, however, does not think of pleasurableness as a *characteristic* feature of the æsthetic unless his attention is called to it, and there is a good deal of popular disinclination to the treatment of pleasure as an element of any special importance in the æsthetic psychosis. Certain men of penetration also raise the most violent opposition to any such treatment.

The popular opposition is not difficult to understand, for the ordinary man does not learn of himself to catch the close relation between a thoughtful phase of psychic life (which in fact is seldom pleasurable to him) and the pleasure quality which may go with it; he habitually thinks of the two not only as separate but as in opposition, and when led to consider anything so complex as the identification of hedonic phase and æsthetic phenomena, he is unable to catch any relation between the laborious thought involved in the consideration, and the revivals which come to him in connexion with the word "pleasure". He is led astray, however, principally by his inability to think clearly. When he thinks of æsthetics he always busies himself with some content of art, and thus it not infrequently happens that it is difficult even to persuade him that pleasure is an ever-present result obtained from the consideration of art forms.

With the theoretic opposition it is not so easy to have patience. Von Hartmann[1] goes so far as to deny us the right to consider the hedonic quality in æsthetics as more than an accident unrelated to the essence of the Beautiful. The psychologist, however, cannot allow himself to be deterred from research in this direction by any objections determined by theoretical preconceptions, although the strong opposition deserves consideration and explanation. Hedonic the æsthetic psychosis certainly is. Whether this hedonic quality is of great moment is a question to be determined.

The Associationists in Psychology have seemed in a way to identify beauty with pleasurableness by claiming it to be the result of the association with objects of agreeable and interesting ideas. Their doctrine in this regard is difficult to treat specifically because of their failure to differentiate Pleasure from the Emotions and because of their treatment of Pleasure as though it were re-presentable, in the same sense that a Content is, rather than being a quality which may attach to a presented Content without belonging to its revival at all.

That associations which are pleasurable are important elements in an æsthetic effect I agree, as will appear later. If the doctrine be held to mean, however, that æsthetic effect is determined altogether by pleasure revivals I cannot follow, for we shall presently see how much presentative pleasures have to do with the effects of beauty.

If, on the other hand, the doctrine be meant to signify an

[1] Confer. *Æs. seit Kant*, p. 354. Von Hartmann grounds his position upon the unimportance of the objective real thing; if this be unimportant, then so also is the hedonic aspect, for, says he, we have as little right to look for the essence of the æsthetic in the effect (Gefühle) as in the cause (the object). (*Æsthetik*, p. 40.) In passing one may note that there seems here to be a hidden shifting of ground. The "cause" of which he speaks is an objective thing, that which he calls "effect" is something which psychologically has no objective significance, and which hence is not an "effect" in the same sense in which the object is the "cause": the objective universality of æsthetic pleasure, which Kant upheld, not concerning us in an analysis of the psychologic state under discussion. But apart from this point, I for one cannot with Von Hartmann see any theoretical objection to looking to the *object* for our criterion, a procedure which he considers altogether reprehensible; to the object in fact we *have* been looking in the past, and the trouble is not that the search in this direction is illegitimate, but that all our looking has brought no result. We find nothing in the object which is always there if the æsthetic quality is to present itself to the observer. We therefore turn our attention away from this object to that much of the subjective state which is not part of this object and there we do find something which is always present where æsthetic effect is produced, *viz.*, pleasure.

identity between hedonic phenomena and æsthetic phenomena we are at once met by the objection that while all Æsthetic states of mind appear to be pleasurable not all pleasurable states are allowed to pass as æsthetic. The problem which is thus brought forward is an important one which we must consider somewhat at length. It may be stated in the form of the question: What are the bounds of the æsthetic within the hedonic field?

No skill in introspective analysis is required to grasp the fact that there is a *separation* between hedonic and æsthetic: the careless thinker is the one most ready to take it for granted, and high authorities also make much of it. Sully, for instance, thinks Kant's elucidation of the separation of the Beautiful from the Good and the Agreeable one of his important achievements for Æsthetics.[1] But it appears to me that altogether too much is made of this separation. Thinkers who are our teachers have over-emphasised the separateness by drawing attention away from the *connexion* between the two fields, and it is important, I think, to take a position opposed to the usual one; to emphasise the *lack* of separateness between Hedonics and Æsthetics.

If one examine the work of art critics and the more or less philosophic and scientific writings which deal with the *facts* of Æsthetics rather than its theory, one will find little more than descriptions of pleasure-getting coupled with more or less thorough attempts to arrange this pleasure-getting in a logical way. If, on the other hand, one examine the writings of those who have expressly studied the psychology of pleasure, one finds æsthetic phenomena treated altogether as the best-recognised data of Hedonics; used to corroborate theory and to justify classification, exactly as the simplest sense-pleasures are used. Let us look at this from another point of view. Take into consideration any average complex æsthetic object; we find it a very wide one with certain elements which are emphatically pleasurable. Eliminate in thought the pleasurable elements one by one, and we find that while in the main the object does not change the mass of its Content, its æsthetic quality gradually disappears. We may acknowledge still that it has a right to be named æsthetic because of the opinions of others and because of our own judgments in the past, but for ourselves at the time it has lost all that makes it worthy of being called by so honourable a name. We are all familiar with the fact that

[1] Article "Æsthetics," *Enc. Britannica*. *Cf.* also Blencke, *Die Trennung d. Schönen v. Angenehm*, p. 3.

an object which but a moment ago was æsthetic for us may become unæsthetic by a degradation to "indifference" or painfulness of the special content which was giving us pleasure. The suggestion of a ridiculous or painful association, with some essential element in an art-complex, will for all time reduce for us the æsthetic value of the whole work. The average art critic indeed very often makes and unmakes æsthetic objects for the masses in this way.

Certainly these facts indicate a very close connexion between the Hedonic and Æsthetic fields, and one which psychologically would seem to be essential. Of course the separation so commonly made must also be acknowledged, and it is worth our while, I think, to consider the main results which have been reached by those who have attempted to mark the lines of separation with distinctness.

This review, if tedious, may be passed over, and, as before, I place it in a special section for the reader's convenience.

§ 4. If the field of æsthetics be a portion of the hedonic field, it certainly ought not to be a difficult task, one would say, in some rough way to mark off that part of the hedonic field which is æsthetic from that which is not: to differentiate the one from the other by a process of limitation of the pleasure field. This, however, does not appear at all an easy matter when one comes to attempt it. The average intelligent observer who has not given the matter especial study will be likely to say, off-hand, that the sense-pleasures at all events are excluded when we refer to the æsthetic. In the exposition of theories from a non-hedonistic point of view this position has been often taken either explicitly or less directly by the limitation of the field to non-sensorial states. Kant's separation of the Agreeable from the Beautiful indeed turns largely upon his notion that the sense-pleasures, which are essential to the former, are wanting in the latter. That æsthetic pleasure is wider than sense is not open to question, but it must be granted that we obtain well-marked æsthetic results which cannot be separated from sensation, such as we find, *e.g.*, in the impression produced by a rich colouring, and in the fulness of simple tones. We find indeed when we go to the root of the matter that it is only the so-called "lower sense" pleasures which it is desired to exclude. The inclusion of sense effects through eye and ear does not create opposition. But it seems to me that if it be admitted that one set of senses can produce æsthetic effect the whole contention fails; and a close examination shows clearly, I think, that the rest of the senses may act in the same manner in the make-up of æsthetic complexes. This

a large majority of the more capable thinkers find it necessary to acknowledge, for they do not hesitate to take the pleasures of the sense-impression into account. Nobody can complain that Lotze had leanings towards sensualism. But he says clearly in this connexion[1] that the first condition of a work of art is its power to please the senses.[2] "If we step into the shadow of the wood at height of noon," says Bergman, "the agreeable refreshment is bound up with the idea of the grandeur of the forest; the refreshing coolness belongs to that which we feel to be the beauty of the wood;" and this comes from one who lays the basis of æsthetics in contemplative thought. For my own part, I feel that the pleasurable impression of any sense may become a rich component part of an æsthetic delight.

If one follow Alison or James Mill and his school,[3] he will refer all æsthetic enjoyment to emotional association. So far as this theory is separable from pure hedonism it is doubtless based upon introspective examination, which for certain people (and to this class I belong) shows powerful elements of Emotion in many æsthetic complexes. For me, Love, Fear, Sorrow, Joy, &c., appear to be part and parcel of many an æsthetic effect. I think it clear therefore that pleasures of the typical emotions are of great moment in æsthetics, but at the same time it is equally true that they do not stand alone as the basis of æsthetic effect. "Association" by itself can of course give no account of distinctively æsthetic effect. It is a principle of important consideration in æsthetics as in all phases of mental life. It shows us the movement by which we reach the beautiful but certainly not the exclusive qualities which produce the distinctive effect.

The historically related opponents of Mill, *viz.*, Reid, Hamilton, and Stewart, all upheld a view which asserts the non-importance of Emotion in claiming overmuch for Intellect; they, however, show more or less willingness to

[1] *Outlines of Æsthetics*, § 23.

[2] The objection of the German Idealists to the consideration of sense-pleasures as of æsthetic worth is based upon theory, but it cannot be supposed that they would uphold views which contradict their experience, and we must seek later to account for so strong an opposition. There is serious objection to the limitation of the use of the word æsthetic to exclude all but the "Scheingefühle" as Von Hartmann does, in the fact that the word now covers very generally the whole ground of the Beautiful, and objective evidence shows that people generally do not accept such a limitation.

[3] J. S. Mill thought that his father had an unconscious follower in John Ruskin. (See his edition of J. Mill's *Analysis*, vol. ii. 258.)

admit the worth of other factors. Other writers go much farther (*e.g.*, Hemsterhuis, Diderot) in their restriction of the æsthetic to the intellectual activities. Kant excludes sense and depends upon reflexion. Both Emotional and Intellectual theories are weakened by failure to accept the sense-element as valuable, but apart from this, such opposed theories, although upheld by thinkers of power, are mutually destructive as arguments looking to the fixing of æsthetic differentia, on account of this very opposition. It is incredible that emotional association can be all of æsthetic enjoyment, when the experience of such men as Reid and Hamilton and Stewart could lead them to hold it unimportant; or that Intellectual activity can be all-important, when the Associationists were able practically to ignore it.

It may be well perhaps to note some late examples of the Intellectual Emphasis. Prof. G. T. Ladd, who does not by any means ignore the sensuous basis, holds (*Elements of Physiological Psychology*, p. 521) that "even most elementary æsthetic feelings cannot be considered as on a par with the sensuous feelings or as mere aggregates of such feelings. The tone of feeling which characterises the sensations furnishes a material for genuinely æsthetic feeling, but the latter always implies also the working of certain intellectual laws and a union of simple feelings of sensation under time-form and space-form." But where shall we find the space-form or time-form in the æsthetic effect produced by mere rich colouring or by the luscious tones of the human voice apartment from any movement? If we follow Prof. Ladd we are compelled to deny the æsthetic quality in such cases altogether. We refer to this theory again below. Bergman's view as to contemplation has been noted. He attempts to cover the ground of Sense and Emotion by bringing them into Intellectual categories. Sense-Beauty, Form-Beauty, "Stimmung"-Beauty; but contemplation is the basis. But, on the other hand, we have no less pretentious a thinker than Von Hartmann[1] denying that distinctly intellectual operations are even pleasurable, and stating that for himself relations of two ideas seem absolutely indifferent up to the line where the intensity of the Vorstellungen becomes so strong that pain ensues. It is interesting to note that this contention is not merely modern. It goes back to Greek speculation; Chrysippus, it will be remembered, holds as an argument against Aristotle that pure speculation is a kind of amusement.

[1] *Æs. s. Kant*, p. 289.

Many other theories have been brought forward which involve limitations, for the most part, far less narrow than in those cases which have just been considered and more often implied by over-emphasis in some special direction than upheld by specific claims: some of these deserve examination.

Reid himself finds that action of Intellect is not alone in giving æsthetic quality, but is bound up with the functioning of our moral faculty in producing the effect reached: while Hamilton, on the other hand, lays stress upon the occupation of the Imagination and Understanding in a full, free, and consequently agreeable activity. Reid shows the step (logical rather than historical) to the emphasis of the play of "Spiritual" feeling which we find in Cousin and Lévêque, in Shaftesbury and in John Ruskin, although Ruskin's æsthetic field may, perhaps, be better described as that of religious ecstasy. Hamilton, on the other hand, shows the step to the extreme emphasis of Imagination which we find in Addison. We may note also in this connexion the trend of thought of which Bergman's position already referred to is an emphatic instance, *viz.*, that the æsthetic basis is to be found in the pleasures of contemplation. But no one who takes a wider view than that of personal introspection can limit the field of æsthetics to moral or to imaginative effects, and I doubt whether any one can thus narrow his own field. He must see æsthetic effects which are non-moral, he must see others which seem to be entirely separable from the imagination; the latter view overlooks the importance of Sense and Emotional elements, which are acknowledged now-a-days to be of great moment.[1]

We cannot go farther in this examination of the effort to separate the Agreeable from the Beautiful without considering Kant's notable contention in this regard. We must not overlook, at the start, the fact that the matter of Kant's consideration was by no means identical with that before us at this moment. We inquire whether in the field of Æsthetic Impression any special Hedonic Element must be cast out. Kant was concerned with the *a priori* character of his theoretical pure judgment; and, strictly speaking, therefore, did not deal with our problem. We may, however, with profit examine his argument to see whether the

[1] The attempt to separate *Scheingefühle* from *reale Gefühle* (Von Hartmann's *Æs.*, pp. 46 ff.), although arising from metaphysical theory, probably is psychologically based upon the same personal bias which led to Addison's extreme view, and which produces the reference to contemplation.

psychological positions involved throw any light upon our closely allied inquiry. Kant's main contention was that the judgment as to Beauty had universal validity, while that concerning the Agreeable was Individualistic,[1] and this was a contention into which he was led upon theoretical rather than empirical grounds. It involved for him, in the first place, the position that sense-pleasures must be excluded from the Æsthetic. For pleasure and pain spring from (1) sense-impression, or (2) from the processes involved in the binding together of ideas: only the latter of which can be general: therefore the field of sense-impression must be individual. We, dealing with the region of Æsthetic Impression, have, I think, already seen convincing evidence that sense-pleasures cannot rightly be excluded; and it seems to me that even if it were conclusively shown that they were strictly individual, *i.e.*, incommunicable, this fact would not prove them to be valueless as elements of æsthetic *impression*. But to return to Kant's argument, his theory in this regard led him further to hold that all Interest must be lacking in the Beautiful. The Sublime he allowed to have a moral interest—for moral interests are the *only* ones which are Universal—but *Beauty* in his view has no direct relation to morality, and, as all other than moral interests are individual, Beauty to remain Universal must exclude interest. This is evidently a position reached from a purely theoretical basis, but apparently it must have had its corroboration in his own psychologic experience. Sympathetic pleasures play an important part in all art work of higher

[1] Blencke (*Trennung d. Schonen v. Angenehm*, p. 89) remarks that the evidence of the psychologic soundness of Kant's position is seen in the fact that we are content *to be pleased* ourselves, while, on the other hand, we try to communicate our judgment as to beauty to others, and such a result Kant's principles would require. But it seems to me that Blencke here goes too far. In the case of pleasures involved in the action of our own peculiar organs, we recognise the pleasures as our own to be sure, but are very ready to endeavour to bring about the same experience in our companions, by urging them to taste or touch, or listen or act as we are doing; and we only feel content that they cannot experience them when we know that they have made the trial. It is merely an extension of this sympathetic altruism which leads us to endeavour to bring out for others by explanation or description the elements of a work of art which give us full pleasure; elements which are not apparent always upon the surface, and, perhaps, dependent upon the sounding of some chord which may be struck directly or associatively by discussion and description. Here, too, when we find discussion and description failing to make the object beautiful for a companion, we come to see that we experience something which he cannot grasp. There seems to be no separation between the course of thought in the two cases.

grade. Moreover, there is probably little doubt that for Kant and a large number of men of his general mental type the most valued pleasures were and are obtained in fields of disinterested effort; that for them purely egoistic pleasure-getting always carries with it an ethical reproof which leans towards the side of pain, and that for such men disinterestedness must therefore be an essential characteristic of the subjective æsthetic field. But it seems to me quite clear that this is a matter of individual mental bias. The ordinary man who is not naturally disinterested in his action does not, I am convinced, find the presence of self-interested elements a bar to æsthetic enjoyment. The pleasurable pride of ownership surely forms an element in the æsthetic delight of many an Art collector. Personal interest enters for all of us into our judgment concerning the beauty of those whom we love, and ownership has the same effect upon the judgment of many men concerning the beauty of their possessions. To return again to Kant's position. The recognition of usefulness implies self-interestedness, directly or indirectly, and Kant therefore found it necessary to hold that the taste judgment was based upon an unpurposive purpose, an *aimless* usefulness[1] (Zweckmässigkeit ohne Zweck), that is, a usefulness of such nature that it is unrecognised as useful, and hence not followed because of the interest involved. As an element in the æsthetic impression, however, I do not think that even *recognisable* usefulness can be overlooked. It is commonly supposed to be an essential to architectural beauty, at all events, and the relation to other branches of the æsthetic is also commonly supposed to be intimate. Kant stands opposed to so great a thinker as Aristotle in this respect, and later observers, such as Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart, Kames and Hogarth, and notably Fechner, make usefulness of great importance æsthetically. Usefulness *per se* in my opinion is not of so high importance as is the absence of non-usefulness, as is indeed all avoidance of shocks, but it seems to me evident that it *is* an æsthetic *element* for most of us, and when we find it considered of moment by such an acute observer as Fechner we are compelled to regard its exclusion as impossible. Ruskin never preached a more fallacious or mischievous doctrine than when he emphasised the thought (Lamp of Sacrifice) that the useless things in structure make Architecture out of Building.

[1] Von Hartmann, *Æs. seit Kant*, p. 23, says even this comes down to objective fitness.

Schiller restates the Kantian notion by his emphasis of the "Play Impulse" in reference to Æsthetics; the modern evolutionary school as represented by Mr. Spencer takes the same position, Prof. Bain following closely. This leads Mr. Spencer to the exclusion of "life-saving functions" from the æsthetic; but what becomes of Mr. Spencer's system if *any* functions (especially pleasurable ones) are thought of as non-life-serving, directly or indirectly, I do not clearly see. Even if some functions of the so-called "higher" kind are classified as non-life-serving, to exclude all which do so serve would surely cut off a large part of our æsthetic field.

As modern psychology draws a clear distinction between receptive and motor nerve, not unnaturally do we find a corresponding psychical distinction looked for in all directions, and Grant Allen in his *Physiological Æsthetics* has attempted to identify the æsthetic with the passive, receptive pleasures. Some such view is also found implied in the theories of not a few metaphysicians, and Fechner[1] takes a strong position in this direction; Mr. Allen may therefore claim the best of company. On the other hand, however, others, Schleiermacher for example, take quite an opposite position in claiming all for the productive side of mentality. Guyau's clear criticism[2] has given the theory of Passivity so powerful a blow that no more than reference seems needful. It is well enough to emphasise the general passive nature of the pleasure involved in æsthetic appreciation as opposed to the active pleasures obtained in the creation of an art work, but this gives us no reason for the exclusion of all pleasures of action from æsthetic compounds. Our psychic life is so bound up with the active[3] side that it is impossible to cut off the active element in any psychosis. Our emotions, our desires, all relate to action, and beyond that what is added to the pleasures of an æsthetic psychosis by the elements of sympathetic activity is far from small.

It is not uninteresting to note here a very late Idealistic view which apparently makes activity all-important. Prof. Ladd in his *Introduction to Philosophy* (p. 343) marks the differentia of æsthetics thus: "Nothing that is apprehended as incapable of change of motion in time or space, and so of the successive realisation of different movements of physical

[1] *Vors. d. Æsthetik*, vol. i. 54.

[2] *Problèmes de l'esthétique contemporaine.*

[3] Horwicz holds that the æsthetic effect produced by the representation of power is due to an aroused idea (Vorstellung) of agreeable muscular action. (*Psychologische Analysen*, Th. ii. Heft 2, p. 166.)

or psychical being, appears beautiful to the human mind. But not all movement of physical or psychical being is beautiful: the movement which is beautiful must have two characteristics. It must have spontaneity, or a certain semblance of freedom; and it must use this spontaneity, as it were, in self-limitation of an idea." It is evident from the very definition that spontaneity, pure and simple, does not approve itself to Prof. Ladd as fundamental; nor can it be held, I think, that we find the phenomena of beauty in all cases where we have "spontaneous movement which uses its spontaneity in self-limitation of an idea".

The distinction between higher and lower grades of pleasure, which is so commonly met with, is by some writers, and by many talkers, made determinant of the difference between the æsthetic and the non-æsthetic. (In Kames we find a good example of this doctrine.) There is something illusory, however, about the very notion of such a distinction, for no criterion for the valuation of pleasure *quâ* pleasure appears beyond its mere intensity.[1] Our gratifications are normally taken in the lines of our natural development; in higher mental regions as we rise, or sad to say, in lower regions if we fall. The direction of growth or of deterioration determines the field of pleasure-getting, and while there is the strongest ground for belief in a constant increase in pleasure-getting capacity, *pari passu* with our mental growth, still it cannot be shown that the delights reached by the man of high moral culture bring a better *quality* of pleasure to him than the gratifications of the barbarian bring to the savage mind; nor can it be shown that the pleasure which we get when we reach a higher moral position is any better *per se* than that which we experienced before we reached it. The fact is that when we speak of the "higher pleasures" we are merely restating our problem in new terms. Those pleasures which are æsthetic are the ones we call "higher," but until we can give some definite meaning to the word "higher" in this connexion we gain nothing. In most cases those who discuss the matter from this standpoint are really dealing with ethical data. It is the man who has grown to be capable of appreciating newer ethical standards, and who has lost his pleasure in the old, who makes a dis-

[1] As Bentham tells us: "Quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry". Confer also Dr. James Ward in *Enc. Brit.*, ix. ed., Art. "Psychology," for a careful statement of the facts. Compare Fechner (*Vor. d. Ästh.*, vol. i. 26), who explains what is called "higher" pleasure as characterised merely by being itself the source of new delights.

tinction between pleasures of higher and lower grade. What he has cast off as unworthy no longer gives him pleasure in contemplation and is no longer felt as æsthetic. This is not, however, because the Æsthetic has an essential ethical dependence, but because Æsthetics is founded upon Hedonics. The man has gained new fields of pleasure-getting as his character has developed: what he casts out as non-æsthetic because it is a "lower pleasure" is a pleasure merely in name, is in reality so bound up with painfulness as to be necessarily unæsthetic. This by no means shows that what was pleasurable in his undeveloped or uncultivated state was not æsthetic for him at that time, or that the pleasures of the savage are not æsthetic for him.

Not that ethical standards are unimportant in Æsthetics. Apart from the æsthetic delight, which we gain from what Aristotle calls Moral Beauty, *i.e.*, from the recognition of nobility of aim and strength of purpose, the appreciation of "æsthetic aspects of character," of "the beauty of holiness," the influence of our ethical standard upon our æsthetic field is most important; for, in the end, most thoughtful people will make their final judgments turn upon them negatively, because what is for them immoral, is painful and non-æsthetic. As we have noted above, however, the majority of our pleasures have no ethical bearings; the mass of æsthetic effects are made up of elements entirely unmoral.

The attempts to determine the bounds of the æsthetic field by a process of limitation of the hedonic appear to me to bring no satisfactory result; nor does it appear that it can be determined by the characteristic manner of presentation of the pleasures which make up the total effect. Fechner[1] suggested a criterion in the Immediacy of the pleasure-getting. Von Hartmann on the other hand thinks Fechner's position is altogether without foundation; holding that however immediate the pleasure connected with an object may be, it does not thus become æsthetic.[2] Such conflict of opinion makes this criterion unsatisfactory.

Horwicz[3] seems to hold that sensational pleasure and æsthetic pleasure differ not in substance but in that the æsthetic shows a broadening of the field. Guyau[4] follows in the same line, suggesting that the broadening of the agreeable horizon, the growth in extension of the pleasure field, is what we experience when an object appears to us to be æsthetic. This implies, as he distinctly states, that intense

[1] *Vorschule d. Æs.*, vol. i. 15.
[2] *Æs. seit Kant*, p. 354.
[3] *Psy. Analysen*, vol. ii. 168.
[4] *Problems*, pp. 75 ff.

and unextended pleasures in their very nature are unæsthetic. This does not accord with my own experience, still I shall not deny that for him a widespread thrill alone produced what he called æsthetic feeling, as may well have been the case with a man to whom sympathy was so important an element of life as it was with the writer of *L'art au point de vue sociologique*. In truth all of our notable æsthetic psychoses are summational hedonic complexes, but this fact does not show, as it is made to argue implicitly, that the pleasurable elements which make up the same are not in themselves æsthetic. I do not wish to understate the value of this width of effect in æsthetics, for I think it of very great importance.

The prominent place which Fechner gives to the Associational principle shows the importance in which he held it. All notable works of Art show it, and all persistent types of Art subject. But, on the other hand, it cannot be held that this summation *per se*, this width of field, this extensiveness, in itself is the all in all in æsthetics. To make it so forces upon us the impossible task of deciding where extension begins; compels us to look for some degree of extension on one side of which all is unæsthetic, while on the other all is æsthetic. Such a line of division, however, cannot be drawn.

(To be continued.)